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Gliwa et al. (2012) focus their analysis of researcher obligations for incidental findings in 
genomic research on three criteria: (1) the benefit to the research participant, which requires 
strong associations with severe disease that has medical actionability; (2) unique access to the 
information and analysis; and (3) the burden that looking and returning incidental findings places 
on the researcher.1  While the authors adopt the ancillary care framework to analyze 
requirements to return incidental findings, I believe the duty to rescue presents several 
advantages while preserving those benefits found in the ancillary care model.  First, utilizing the 
duty to rescue avoids conflating the return of genetic information with providing needed clinical 
care.  Second, a rescue–based approach recognizes the ethical duties researchers have toward the 
research study and offers a mechanism for appropriately balancing these with obligations to 
individual subjects.  Finally, using the duty to rescue as the ethical underpinning for incidental 
finding obligations answers definitively that there is no duty to search for incidental findings. 
The duty to rescue has been underanalyzed and relatively unexplored in recent debates on 
research ethics (Merritt, Taylor, and Mullany 2010).2  In terms of the incidental findings 
quandary, the duty to rescue model requires disclosure when a researcher discovers genetic 
information that indicates a risk of significant harm that they are in a position to mitigate with 
little risk to the overall research study.  While there are some similarities between this approach 
and one anchored in the ancillary care framework, the duty to rescue presents a more definitive 
answer in what must be returned.  For example, the authors contend that duties of ancillary care 
in genomic research relate to information that is medically beneficial rather than increasing 
knowledge or awareness (Gliwa et al. 2012).3  Yet, under an ancillary care analysis others have 
determined researchers are required to return incidental findings the subject is likely to believe 
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are of health importance or reproductive importance (Wolf et al. 2008).4  Thus, a clear conflict 
arises in attempting to determine what qualifies as mandatory information to return when 
utilizing an ethical framework that was developed in the context of clinical care (Richardson and 
Belsky 2004).5   
Conflating the provision of clinical care and genetic information may be dangerous given 
the manner in which our understanding of the connections between genetic variants and specific 
diseases is constantly evolving.  Even the authors concede that genomic science is in its infancy 
and, therefore, cannot necessarily be described as a benefit in every circumstance (Gliwa et al. 
2012).6  As such, it appears that distinguishing between supplying ancillary care and ancillary 
information may be helpful not only to IRBs and researchers but, more importantly, to subjects 
(Clayton and McGuire 2012).7  Indeed, merging these two paradigms may play a part in the 
often cited preferences of subjects to receive any and all information that can be gathered from 
their genomic sequencing.  With the risk of a therapeutic misconception always looming, it is 
imperative that the possibility of receiving any genetic information not be equated to an 
opportunity to cure a disease that is certain to arise.  Meanwhile, the duty to rescue informs all 
parties involved that only in the case where there is significant risk of harm that can be mitigated 
should incidental finding obligations begin to arise. 
These duties to return incidental findings must be weighed against the burden such a duty 
places on the researcher, as Gliwa et al. (2012) repeatedly state.8  The ethical responsibilities that 
researchers have to the study itself, including the duties to achieve the study goals and to the 
subjects who enrolled in the study to help accomplish those goals, are often overlooked.  While 
many subjects may have incidental findings, there may be other subjects who do not.  The 
subjects who do not underwent risks of enrollment to help achieve the research objective and, 
therefore, the researcher has an obligation to see that the study protocol is followed to 
completion.  It would certainly be an ethical paradox if requirements to return incidental findings 
                                                 
4 Susan M. Wolf et al., “Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and 
Recommendations,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 36 (2008): 15. 
5 Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, “The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers,” Hastings 
Center Report 34 (2004): 26. 
6 Gliwa et al., (2012): 14. 
7 Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, “The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research,” 
Genetics in Medicine 14 (2012): 473. 
8 Gliwa et al., (2012): 6, 9, 12, 13–14, 17. 
3 
 
to certain individual subjects became so broad as to demand too many resources to allow for the 
completion of the study purpose they supposedly enrolled for (Meyer 2008).9 
The duty to rescue provides an inherent mechanism to appropriately balance the 
obligations to individual subjects with the overall research study.  The duty to rescue arises when 
there is a risk of significant harm that the rescuer’s action has a high probability of mitigating, 
there is little risk of harm to the rescuer, and the benefit gained outweighs the potential risks 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001).10  That last aspect of balancing the benefits and the burdens 
ensures that the pursuit of generalizable knowledge maintains its place as the primary purpose of 
research while individual subjects are protected from actionable harm.   
This duty to rescue approach addresses the critical role resources play in requirements of 
returning incidental findings.  As seen by the frequency with which the authors raise the issue of 
resources, it is vital that an ethically sound principle be employed to appropriately find where 
resources fit in, as the issue of resources is frequently raised but rarely discussed in depth.  A 
rescue–based model finds that resource restraints create an ethical ceiling by limiting the 
resources that can be committed toward individual subjects if it will jeopardize the ability of the 
researcher to complete the study.  Alternatively, the duty to rescue creates a floor for disclosure 
obligations by finding that researchers cannot simply avoid incidental findings altogether when 
they discover a harm that they are in a position to alleviate.   
With all of the promise that genomic research has, it is important not to lose focus on the 
benefits that have and will be gained by conducting this research.  As such, the objectives of 
these studies are worthy of protection as well.  The creation of a broad duty to return incidental 
findings, as well as search for them, could prove disastrous if this becomes a standard of care 
that gives rise to legal duties and potential lawsuits (Clayton and McGuire 2012).11  Certainly the 
resources needed to fight malpractice litigation, a large reason for bifurcating research and 
clinical practice, should be factored in as well (Meltzer 2006).12 
Finally, a duty to rescue framework for incidental findings affords a straightforward 
answer to the question Gliwa et al. present: is there a duty to search for incidental findings, and if 
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not, could there be one in the future?  The rescue model would suggest the answer to both 
questions is no.  The duty to rescue applies when one finds themselves in a position to mitigate 
harm to another without significant risk to one’s self (Beauchamp and Childress 2001).13  
However, it does not compel anyone to search out harm that they may be able to alleviate.   
This distinction is relevant not only to a short term requirement but it speaks to the Gliwa 
et al. long–term analysis as well.  The authors’ focus on access to information is a patient–
centered examination, where the ethical relevance is whether the subject is able to access their 
genomic information outside of the study.  A rescue–based approach looks at access to 
information from the researcher perspective, placing an obligation on researchers if they access 
information that would lead them to believe there is a risk of harm that can be diminished (Gliwa 
et al. 2012).14   
In this sense, the potential proliferation genomic technology in standard medicine is not 
relevant if a researcher has access to a subject’s genomic sequence and finds an incidental 
finding that they believe the duty to rescue commands disclosure of.  A researcher should not be 
able to avoid ethical obligations of reducing harm simply because a subject could access their 
genomic information outside of a study with relative ease.  The duty to rescue applies to all 
moral agents (Richardson and Belsky 2004; Meyer 2008),15 and researchers are simply placing 
themselves in a position where they are more likely to discover genetic variants and have the 
capacity to prevent serious harm.  Consequently, a rescue–based model will always demand a 
baseline obligation while maintaining no requirement to search for incidental findings regardless 
of the technological access to the public.   
It is worth noting that this discussion surrounds what researchers are obligated to do in 
the conduct of genomic research.  Although a rescue–based approach to incidental findings 
creates both a ceiling and a floor, protecting the research study and the individual subjects, 
respectively, there is a wide range within this spectrum where researchers can incorporate their 
own preferences or that of their subjects if they so choose.  The key is to remind ourselves that 
creating a baseline that all research must be held accountable which is too high may have 
negative consequences.  The duty to rescue framework for incidental findings makes certain that 
serious harm that can be alleviated will be, rather than pushing for an obligation so broad that it 
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may incentivize more anonymized research (Fryer–Edwards and Fullerton 2006) 16 or, even 
worse, less genomic research in general.17 
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